T ax reforms continue to be a feature of the Russian economic landscape as policymakers are looking for solutions that would both secure suffi cient budgetary income and contribute to economic growth in the country. In 2000 some sweeping changes were launched, amounting to a virtual revolution in taxation. The focus was, fi rst, on making taxes more acceptable and "user-friendly" for taxpayers and, second, on creating an environment in which paying taxes would make more economic sense to taxpayers than meeting the cost of avoiding them.
These reforms stirred interest across the world. In particular, the introduction of a fl at income tax at the rate of only 13% and the replacement of the four separate social security taxes with a combined Unifi ed Social Tax payable on a regressive scale with a maximum rate of 35.06% (later reduced to 26%) were seen as the two most notable innovations. The reaction was generally positive, so much so that even President Bush announced that he was impressed with the tax reform in Russia. 1 Now that almost fi ve years have passed since the new tax rules were adopted it is possible to give some early evaluation of their implications. In this paper we look at just one aspect of the tax reform: the evolvement of payroll taxes and social fund contributions from a plethora of contentious payments into the Unifi ed Social Tax (UST), and its consequences. This choice is not incidental. The dynamics of social taxes in modern Russia are closely related to one of the most divisive and consequential policymaking issues in the country: the role and functions of the system of social welfare. Poor social provisions, suffering from underresourcing, have been a cause of continual public discontent. As a result, the task of raising funds for social services gains an importance that goes beyond just the issue of ameliorating the tax system.
Designs and Realities
During the fi rst decade of post-communist transition, the Russian tax system acquired a structure and many features which are present in Western Europe (reliance on direct and indirect taxes, including the personal income tax, corporate income tax, payroll taxes, VAT, excises and customs tariffs), whilst tax rates were modelled on the US example. And yet, despite these attempts to imitate best practices, by 2000 the national tax system had discredited itself. It achieved only a very low rate of tax collection, whilst at the same time gaining notoriety for being abusive and corrupt. To an extent this poor performance could be blamed on the legacy of socialist taxation, but even more damaging were some disruptive trends that haunted economic reforms in Russia in the 1990s. A tax reform was needed that would adjust the mechanism of taxation to the realities of a transition economy.
The impact of these realities was felt at different levels. To begin with, the taxpayers as well as tax authorities had no previous experience of modern taxation. The notion of tax burden was new for most taxpayers, voluntary compliance and self-fi ling were virtually unknown as the old system was characterised by implicit taxation. 2 If we add growing mistrust towards the government and bureaucracy to the equation, it is not surprising that tax evasion emerged as a natural choice for many when economic actors were confronted for the fi rst time with explicit tax requirements. 3 Things were not helped by the attitude of tax authorities and the politics behind economic reforms. Emphasis on intrusive supervision resulted in the proliferation of tax laws and regulations, providing a Andrei Kuznetsov* and Lubov Goncharenko**
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Intereconomics, July/August 2006 210 fertile ground for abuse and discrimination. The situation was exacerbated by an excessive fi scal decentralisation. "As a consequence, tax liabilities have often been negotiated rather than determined by law. To make matters worse, tax authorities were allowed to impose highly punitive penalties which often bear no relationship to the actual tax liability … Because of this administrative leeway … corruption fl ourished." 4 Attempts to introduce a comprehensive tax code were repeatedly delayed by the vested interests of the oligarchs and bureaucrats, both groups benefi ting from the lack of transparency and accountability. When finally endorsed in 1999, the code still suffered from inconsistencies and contradictions.
It was of great signifi cance that tax reforms were taking place against the background of a major economic collapse when millions of people and thousands of enterprises were fi ghting for survival. The offi cial data are conservative, evaluating the share of population with income below the subsistence level, i.e. the rate of absolute poverty, at 30% throughout this period. 5 As for businesses, the share of loss-making fi rms exceeded 40% in industry, 60% in transport and 33% in construction. 6 Even under a perfectly working taxation system this would have led to considerable diffi culties. However, in Russia the situation was made even more complex by the widely spread inter-enterprise and wage arrears that beseiged the Russian economy in the 1990s. They caused Russian producers to drift away from monetary transactions towards barter. Even employees received their wages as payments in kind, which facilitated tax evasion. Barter had reached an unprecedented scale: for the majority of industrial fi rms this form of transaction represented half of their entire turnover and for many as much as 73%. 7
As a result tax collection has turned into a battle in which the state and society at large soon found themselves on the losing end. Entrepreneurs were outraged by high rates and the time and effort it took to comply with all the regulations, which they believed were lethal for their businesses, and found it necessary to move their operation into the parallel or "shadow" economy. According to the Expert Institute of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, up to 75% of fi rms practised concealment of a con-siderable proportion of income, placement of capital abroad and evasion of excise duty and smuggling as the most common forms of "shadow" activity. 8 A report prepared by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Science claims that nearly two thirds of the entrepreneurs would be ready to bribe an offi cial and eight out of ten consider tax evasion and fraud a viable business tactic. 9 The state, which saw its budget defi cit soaring, had to increase its spending on tax enforcement but the results were dismal as business found it cheaper to pay off tax inspectors and tax police or expatriate their capital rather than pay taxes. According to offi cial statistics, in the late 1990s only 17% of businesses operating in Russia paid their taxes on time and in full, 50% made only occasional payments and 33% made no payments at all. 10
The Tax Revolution
Mass impoverishment, barter transactions, corruption, tax evasion, capital fl ight, catastrophic fall of industrial output and the growth of the shadow economy were the background against which new ideas about the role, structure and administration of taxation in Russia were taking shape. It was accepted that often the main incentives to evade taxes were provided by the tax system itself due to excessive taxation, lack of transparency and fairness, extreme decentralisation and emphasis on disproportionately punitive action. This realisation prepared the grounds for the revolution in taxation that started in August 2000. The blueprint for reforms included the simplifi cation of the tax system; the introduction of lower tax rates, especially of personal and profi t taxes; the abolishment of some particularly unpopular taxes; and the use of regressive scales for the calculation of some wage and salary taxes.
New regulations heralded a fundamental change in perception of the role of taxation compared to the attitude prevailing among policymakers in the 1990s. At that time it was sought to resolve problems with tax collection through the establishment of a dedicated police force and an ever-increasing number of authoritarian rules and regulations. The big prize that inspired the new initiatives was the prospect of returning to the offi cial economy the assets, tentatively evaluated at hundreds of billions of dollars, that had been moved into the "shadow" economy under the previous tax regime.
The reforms were put into practice in three stages in 2001, 2002 and 2004 . The main features of the tax system which emerged as a result are as follows. The three income-tax rates of old (12, 20 and 30%) were replaced by a 13% fl at tax (non-residents have to pay a rate of 30% on income from Russian sources); corporate tax was reduced from 35% to 24%; 11 capital gains on the disposal of securities are subject to profi ts tax at 24%; VAT is levied at a general rate of 18% on taxable supplies that include the majority of domestic sales of goods and services; 12 the four separate social security taxes were replaced by a combined Unifi ed Social Tax payable to the Federal budget, the Social Insurance Fund and Medical Insurance Fund on a regressive scale with a maximum rate of 26%, whilst employers' contributions to the Employment Fund have been abolished. Simultaneously most regional sales taxes, special regulations and exceptions were abolished; new accounting rules were brought forward, introducing international accounting standards to Russia. Despite these steps towards a more compact, manageable and transparent system, a frustrating multitude of taxes remains: there is also a 5% advertising tax, a 2% property tax, a 1% road tax, plus various registration fees.
The initial response to changes in the tax regime was very favourable: in 2001 alone revenue from personal income tax burgeoned by nearly 47% (an increase of 25.2% in real terms after adjusting for infl ation), whilst tax revenue overall rose by 50%; the federal budget showed a surplus of 2.4%. Tax collection continued to improve in the following years, in particular with respect to personal income tax: it grew in real terms by 24.6% in 2002 and 15.2% in 2003. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development called Russia's fl at tax system a "key accomplishment," a rare praise from an organisation known for its critical stance. However, not all elements of the reform worked equally well. The introduction of the Unifi ed Social Tax, probably the most important new element of the new taxation strategy after the fl at personal income tax, has not produced the expected results.
The Failure of Social Taxation
The dynamics of social taxes in modern Russia cannot be fully understood without reference to the dramatic changes in the welfare state that have taken place following the collapse of the centrally planned economy. The extensive provision of subsidised or charge-free social services to the public was a crucial feature of the Soviet system. People's income could have been modest, but they felt well protected as far as the provision of education, health, pensions and social services, including housing and supporting utility networks, was concerned. Signifi cantly, social cervices were provided not only by the state but also by state-owned enterprises: total social spending by the enterprise sector amounted to about 25% of the entire consolidated budget in the early 1990s.
The situation changed dramatically with the transition to capitalism. On the one hand, marketisation, leading to the growing risks of unemployment and impoverishment for a considerable part of the population, has greatly increased the need for social support. On the other hand, both the state and enterprises could not sustian the provision of social resources at customary levels. The consequences were grave. Most people were neither accustomed nor prepared, nor given an opportunity, to look after themselves. The amount and quality of traditional welfare was declining dramatically whilst a modern social safety net of the Western type was non-existent. For example, there was no practice of employers and workers contributing to a pension fund as all pensions were paid from the state budget and funded through general taxation.
Despite continued attempts to design a working system of social payments and taxes, results remained disappointing throughout the 1990s. In 1994, to take one typical year, the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation managed to raise only two-thirds of the expected payroll contributions. In the same vein, territorial medical insurance funds managed to collect just 30 to 35% of the projected total.
The poor performance of social taxes had a number of explanations. To begin with, the system of payments was extremely complex and its management fragmented and cumbersome. Up to 2001 only the rates of taxation were set by the federal law. Social contributions were to be paid directly into non-budgetory specialised funds: the State Pension Fund, the Social Insurance Fund, regional and federal Medical Insurance Funds and the State Employment Fund. The tax base for these payments, the regime of payment and other administrative issues were regulated by numerous instructions, directives and guidelines released by the managing bodies of all these Funds. On top of registering with local tax authorities every fi rm had to reg-ister with the local bureaus of each of the four Funds to which they had to report monthly. Each Fund would send out its own inspectors to verify compliance and impose its own sanctions on offenders. The parallel existence of different payment requirements confused accountants and made them make mistakes. Stifl ing control and numerous inspections interfered with the normal operations of fi rms. At the same time the absence of federal laws made it diffi cult for fi rms to seek protection in courts in their disputes with the four Funds. The decentralisation of tax collection not only increased the cost for taxpayers but for the state as well: the Funds were less effi cient than the state tax service and spent more of their budget per collected rouble than the Finance Ministry. Overall, making each of the funds responsible for the collection of its own contributions multiplied collection costs.
Being a form of wage taxes, social payments proved particularly diffi cult to collect. Numerous tax evasion schemes had emerged, of which obnalichivanie (black cash tax evasion) was particularly widespread. Yakovlev 13 describes this scheme as follows. It is based on the replacement of high-taxed elements of total revenue such as salary or profi t by low-taxed elements such as material expenditures, using the contract between the fi rm-taxpayer and an intermediary "sham" fi rm. Under the terms of the contract, the taxpayer transfers money to the bank account of the sham fi rm in exchange for a phoney work report. In exchange the taxpayer receives unaccounted, or "black", cash. The total amount of black cash returned equals bank payments minus the commission of the sham fi rm, typically less than 2% to 3% of the initial client's payment. The black cash funds are thus available for unoffi cial salary payments, investment or discretionary use by the fi rm management or the entrepreneur. According to estimates by Yakovlev, in 1993-1996 alone the four social Funds lost between US$ 20 and 30 billion to this scheme. Whilst in large fi rms sharing black cash with employees would be too conspicuous, it has become common for small and medium-sized enterprises to operate under a dual salary scheme. Every month they pay their employees a certain sum in cash, often in a foreign currency, but for the tax inspectors they keep another set of records on their books, showing much lower wages in roubles. The gap between real and "offi cial" salaries may be huge. Employees can make between $100 and $300 per month, while on paper they earn a mere 500 to 1,300 roubles, equivalent to $16 to $42. 14 The reason for this practice is evident from the data in Table 1 . It demonstrates that before the 2001-2004 reforms taxes on wages were equal to up to 67.6% of the total sum of wages.
On the whole, the system of social taxation in its 1990s guise was a disappointment and had the following drawbacks: it achieved extremely low rates of collections; it had high administration costs; it was extremely intrusive and disruptive as far as the activities of taxpayers were concerned; it was neither transparent nor fair, leaving a lot of room for bureaucratic arbitrariness. Overall, this system encouraged tax eva- sion, did little to establish the culture of paying taxes in the country and possibly contributed to social misery during this most diffi cult period of transition. This was not just because the state could not collect enough resources to support its social programmes, but also because fi rms were forced to lay off labour or pay lower wages to minimise their tax exposure. 15
The Introduction of the Unifi ed Social Tax
The Unifi ed Social Tax (UST) was introduced in August 2000 as a solution to the crisis of social payments. It is a federal tax regulated by Chapter 24 of the new Federal Tax Code (Part 2). It became effective on 1 January 2001 and replaced all the payments that the four social funds used to collect independently. Its object of taxation is remuneration of any kind accrued in favour of a natural person employed under a labour or a civil law contract to perform work or render services, and royalty under copyright contracts.
UST has some unique features. This is the only tax for which the law explicitly determines how the proceeds should be used: half of it is allocated to pensions and the rest is split between social and medical insurance. Also, a substantial amount of payments goes directly into relevant social funds, but the scale at which these payments are made is now established in the Code itself. There are not many exceptions or special norms, making this tax transparent and equitable. A further new feature is that the tax base for the UST is not the total sum of payroll as before. The tax is calculated for every employee individually. This has to do with another unique characteristic of the UST: it is paid on a regressive scale in order to encourage enterprises to legalise their black cash payments.
Originally the scale of annual UST payments was as follows: 35.6% on the fi rst 100,000 roubles; 20% on earnings from 100,001 to 300,000 roubles; 10% on earnings from 300,001 to 600,000 roubles; and 2% on all earnings over 600,000 roubles. It must be noted that this radical move did not create any sizable threat to the budget as 99% of offi cially paid annual wages were below 50,000 roubles.
When the UST was introduced in 2001, its top rate of 35.6% was lower than the summary rate of 38.5% that was payable during the previous decade. The regressive scale made the potential benefi ts for high-earning taxpayers even more substantial. Not surprisingly, the new tax was favourably rated by the business community. In 2004 UST had become the largest money-maker for the budget, pushing VAT, traditionally the largest earner, into second place. And yet the introduction of UST has not really brought about the desired breakthrough in the collection of social payments. As a matter of fact, the share of these payments in GDP has been falling progressively ever since UST was made operational and has never reached the pre-2001 level (see Table 2 ).
Still the UST rate of 35.6% proved to be very high in the eyes of enterpreneurs, especially if contrasted with the personal income tax rate of 13% and the corporate tax rate of 24%. In fact, it was lower than in some other European transition countries (Bulgaria 44.7%, Poland 47.3%), but higher compared to developed European countries (Sweden 26%, UK 22%). Almost immediately taxpayers started to exploit loopholes in the Tax Code to avoid UST. In order to implement the principle that payments to employees should be taxed only once, UST was not levied on expenses covered from after-tax profi ts. After-tax profi ts were defi ned as the difference between the fi nancial result for the reporting period, computed on the basis of accounting records, and the amount of profi ts tax and other mandatory payments due. Therefore, after-tax, or retained, profi ts for unifi ed social tax purposes referred to funds remaining at the disposal of an organisation after ac- 
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tual payment of the profi ts tax. The owners of an enterprise were free to decide how to use these funds. Under these conditions it made economic sense for employers to show a part of the payroll as profi t taxable at 24% and reimburse employees from retained profi t by paying them "bonuses". The budget would receive more corporate tax but not enough to compensate the loss of UST chargeable at the rate that was a third higher. Another tax avoidance scheme based on the same idea that particularly suited small and medium-sized enterprises was not to put employees on the payroll but subcontract them as independent entrepreneurs.
Disappointingly, the regressive scale failed to encourage people to state their actual wages. In 2003 only 118.4 thousand employees, only just 0.002% of the labour force, declared an annual income of over 600,000 roubles (about $1,800 per month). Although there are no offi cial statistics, independent experts estimate the number of employees that earned over $2,000 per month as at least 5% of the labour force or 3.3 million people. In other words, only one in 25 eligible taxpayers was tempted by the regressive scale.
Predictably, the response of the policymakers was to apply more of the same medicine. Already in late 2003/early 2004 signals were sent out that the UST was to be reduced soon. However, when the ammendments to the tax were revealed in January 2005, they sent out a mixed signal about the possible future of the UST. On the one hand, the base rate was reduced from 35.6% to 26%. On the other, the scale has become less regressional.
From 2005 UST has the following annual rates: 26% on the fi rst 280,000 roubles, 10% on earnings from 280,001 to 600,000 roubles and 2% on all earnings over 600,000 roubles. The new scale favours those taxpayers who pay wages of up to 25,000 roubles per month and leaves the tax burden almost unchanged for wages above this sum. Consequently it is expected that in 2005 no more than one per cent of employees are likely to reveal wages that put them on the regressive stretch of the scale. In other words, the main objective of the regressive scale, to bring black cash salaries above the board, remains as remote as before.
Does the UST Have a Future?
After a decade of stringent controls, the Russian tax system has embraced liberalism as a key principle of its organisation. As far as the UST is concerned, the objective has been to increase offi cial wages and draw job remuneration out of the shadow sector. According to the calculations of the Budget and Tax Committee of the Russian parliament, under the best of scenarios about 30 billion roubles (US$ one billion) can be expected to be legalised, increasing the tax proceeds of the social funds. 16 In reality the UST has not achieved its objective so far. In fact, in 2001-2004 the share of social payments into the budget was lower than it used to be before the introduction of the UST. On the positive side, in 2004 the collection of social taxes increased over the previous year by 21.7%. If this trend proves to be sustainable, it will signify a major breakthrough in relations between taxpayers and the authorities. In the meantime analysis suggests that it will not be easy for the new tax to meet all expectations.
The UST remains one of the most complex taxes in terms of administration. Employers pay the UST by monthly advances at the end of each calendar month; the balance between the tax due and the sum of advances must be paid not later than on the 20th of the next month and fi nally the end of the year settlement should be paid not later than 15 days after the annual tax return deadline. The tax is to be dispatched to a number of recipients such as the federal budget, the Social Insurance Fund and federal and regional funds of Compulsory Medical Insurance. This requires fi lling in as many as eleven payment orders every time the tax is paid. Besides, the taxpayer has to submit regular estimates on advance payments to the tax bodies.
More signifi cantly, the hallmark of the new tax, its regressive scale, has failed to make any noticeable difference in the behaviour of taxpayers. Only a tiny fraction of high salaries has been legalised. This is a reminder that the UST is only a part of the equation that also includes the organisation of social expenditures. The attitude to UST by taxpayers will not change unless there are improvements in welfare provisions. Here the situation is not very encouraging. One of the Lowering the rate even further and simplifying its administration may indeed be a way forward, although it must be noted that after the latest revisions total payroll taxes in Russia came very close to the rates payable in the developed European countries. However, the evaluation of this option requires putting the UST in the context of the national social budget as a whole. The Finance Ministry estimated that the recent reduction of the rates would cost the already strained budget between 189 and 220 billion roubles in 2005 alone. In anticipation of this shortfall the government took the extraordinary decision to use the resources of the emergency Stabilisation Fund as a source for pensions in 2005. It is clear that the problem of social taxes cannot be resolved in isolation from measures that modernise the distribution of social benefi ts and the social safety net considering that seventy per cent of the population are entitled to benefi ts. Modernisation may take two directions: achieving greater effi ciency by transferring some payments directly to taxpayers and changing the pension and social payments regulations in such a way that they make it less attractive for employees to receive salaries under the table.
For example, it is reasonable to expect that if the payment of medical insurance for short-term illnesses is reassigned to employers, the cost of administration is going to fall in comparison with the current centralised system, increasing the effective rate of taxation. However, a central position should be given to pension reforms because of the link between the UST and pensions (pensions are paid entirely out of UST proceeds at the moment), the great size of pension funds and the critical demographic situation in the country. 18 One option is to make employees contribute to the Federal Pension Fund as is the norm in many coun-tries. Some positive results may be achieved through the development of the market for fi nancial services. At the moment it is in an embryonic state, mostly due to the lack of trust between fi nancial companies and potential clients. However, an increase in the popularity of private pension schemes will put pressure on employees to receive higher offi cial salaries because the current legislation makes the total amount which individuals can invest into the private pension system conditional on their declared salary. Equally, as the demand for consumer credit and mortgages begins to grow, employees will realise that their credit standing will depend on employer-supplied proof of actual wages. However, private pension funds and the availability of other fi nancial instruments are unlikely to make any noticeable impact on the behaviour of Russian people because the economic situation in the country unequivocally encourages short-term choices. Suffi ce it to say that at 60, the average male's retirement age is higher than his life expectancy of 59 and investors' horizons rarely extend beyond 6 months. 19
Reforms Must Go On
There have been remarkable improvements in the performance of the tax system in Russia in the last fi ve years. Nonetheless the tax system in Russia has not stabilised yet. The government's strategic line continues to be the creation of a more effi cient and transparent system. This attitude was confi rmed in the president's state of the nation address at the end of April 2005, when he urged fi scal agencies not to "terrorise" business. The fi ne-tuning of tax rates is far from being over. There are indications that a reduction of VAT may be on the cards as well as the introduction of additional amortisation premiums for investments and the simplifi cation of the rules of including the cost of R&D and experimental works in expenses. Following this course is going to be a very diffi cult balancing act as mounting losses will have to be covered somehow. The fi nancial requirements of social security remain immense and may even increase if the adverse social consequences of the transition are not reversed. The price of a mistake can be very high but the pace of reform cannot be slowed if the modernisation targets set by the government are to be met.
